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Abstract 
 
Cliff Haley: The Politics of Assimilation, Muslims and the Anti-republican Right 
 in 1930’s Algeria 
(Under the direction of Donald M. Reid) 
 
  
 The history of indigenous politics in 1930’s Algeria has been written with an eye 
towards uncovering the origins of Algerian nationalism. While historians of the period have 
been forced occasionally to confront the evidence of Muslim attraction to extreme right 
politics, they have not considered the possibility that dissatisfied Muslims could have been so 
discouraged by the policies and practices of the French Republic as to pursue a radical anti-
republican agenda. European political parties on the extreme right guided Muslim politicians 
in this anti-republican strategy. The well-known histories of Algeria have never taken 
seriously the anti-republican politics of Algerian Muslim and have thus not acknowledged 
cooperation between Muslims and European political right. 
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Introduction 
The widely accepted histories of Algeria have been written by moderate republican, 
Socialist, and Communist historians susceptible to a certain historiographic blind spot.1A 
commitment to republicanism shared by these historians leaves no place for an account 
which takes seriously cooperation between the French anti-republican right and Muslim 
Algerian politicians. In the 1930s, many French expressed frustration with the government in 
new ways through creation of anti-republican parties in France and in Algeria. If we could 
allow for the possibility that Muslims might express themselves similarly, we will reach a 
new understanding of Algerian politics in the 1930s and its relationship to the origins of 
Algerian nationalism. 
Following the outbreak of the Algerian War in 1954, moderate and liberal historians 
rewrote the history of Algeria to provide an understanding of the demands for independence 
made by Algerian rebels. Charles-André Julien and Charles-Robert Ageron, recognized as 
the preeminent French historians of Algeria by wartime and postwar generations and each 
dedicated to a model of republican equality, placed exploitation of Muslim victims at the 
heart of the conflict and established a new model for historical interpretations of Algeria 
                                                 
1Charles-Robert Ageron and Charles-André Julien are largely responsible for the tone of scholarship concerning 
Algeria during, and immediately following the Algerian War. Charles-Robert Ageron, Histoire de l’Algérie 
contemporaine (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974). Charles-André Julien, Histoire de l’Afrique du 
Nord (Paris : Payot, 1961). Jean Claude Vatin has characterized Julien and Ageron’s work as committed to, “the 
liberal illusion long cherished of a possible good colonization, of an Algerian nation grouping Muslims, 
Christians, indigènes and Europeans.” Jean Claude Vatin, L’Algérie politique histoire et société (Paris : Presses 
de la fondation nationale des sciences politique(1983), 34. What Vatin is identifying is a commitment to good 
Republican fusion of disparate people and interests into one body politic.  
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under colonial rule. Julien, Ageron and other historians, many of them personally involved in 
the history they were writing, interpreted the Algerian War as the struggle of Muslims 
desperate for the republican freedoms denied to them by generations of exploitative 
colonists. These historians had always understood the extreme right in Algeria to be anti-
republican. Writing from a perspective in the 1950s, these authors further associated racial 
discrimination perpetuated by the colons with the same lack of respect for republican rights 
that characterized the Nazi occupation of France. The conduct of the Algerian War from 
1954 to 1962, and the racism of the colons, led to further comparisons of supporters of 
French Algeria to anti-republican fascists. After the war, hundreds of thousands of repatriated 
French Algerians would swell the ranks of the far right Front National, and the association 
between a racist colonial regime and the anti-republican right became firmly established in 
general French discourse.  
 The historical model established under Ageron and Julien interpret the Algerian War 
as a fight over republican liberties, and thus, the scholarship following the outbreak of war in 
1954 has not been able to explain why Muslim Algerians would ever knowingly associate 
with men hostile to the very idea of a liberal republic. While historians have been forced 
occasionally to confront the evidence of Muslim attraction to extreme right wing politics, 
they have not considered the possibility that dissatisfied Muslims could have been so 
discouraged by the policies and practices of the French Republic as to pursue an anti-
republican agenda. The trauma of collaboration by the anti-republican Vichy regime during 
the Second World War led historians dedicated to the French republican tradition to consider 
unthinkable the notion that any anti-republican right offered a viable political alternative in 
Algeria. Rather, they have interpreted those Muslims favoring the anti-republican right as 
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they would understand their European compatriots seduced by the same ideas, solely as 
opportunists, as anti-Semites, or perhaps worst of all, as dupes. 
1930: The Centenary of French Algeria 
The history of the first hundred years of French occupation of Algeria is characterized 
by the process of transforming Algeria from an European settlement in North Africa to a 
French territory of three départements, like those in France across the Mediterranean. After 
1871, a civilian government responsible directly to the Department of the Interior in Paris 
governed the territory in place of a military occupation and administrators undertook to 
transform the land and the people of Algeria into an extension of France.2 An essential part 
of this process was the civic conversion of the non-French population of European origin 
living in Algeria—Maltese traders, Italian fishermen and Spanish laborers—to French 
citizens. This civic conversion is interpreted by John Ruedy as a practical decision to unite a 
sizable European population under the French flag to stand as a bulwark against the Muslims 
of Algeria and other European powers looking to settle in North Africa. However, this 
attempt to remake Algeria in the image of France also conforms to the predominant colonial 
ideology of France, the mission civilisatrice.3 The colonial philosophy of the French Third 
Republic guaranteed that any person demonstrating an advanced degree of “civilization” 
would be considered as an equal and made a French citizen. The colonial extension of this 
mission deemed that colonized people, desirous of integration with France, would acquire the 
                                                 
2Algeria was also alternately placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War, or a Ministry of Colonies, but 
the Interior Ministry was the preferred choice for those wishing for integration of Algeria with France.  
Seemingly most Muslims preferred the military administration to the civilian regime and the change in 1871 has 
been considered as one of the factors leading to a widespread insurrection in the 1870s. John Ruedy, Modern 
Algeria : The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992). 
 
3For the evolution of this philosophy and its importance to the Republic see Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to 
Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa , 1895-1930, (Stanford: Stanford Press, 
1997). Though Conklin is primarily focused on West Africa, the mission civilisatrice also had relevance in 
North Africa.  
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needed civilization by adopting French cultural norms. Once demonstrating the requisite 
level of civilization, they would be made citizens. In 1870s Algeria, this logic was displayed 
with the 1871 Crémieux decree that naturalized the Jews of Algeria. Though inhabitants of 
Algeria centuries before the French invasion of 1830, Algerian Jews, through comparison 
with French Jews, were judged as being adequately civilized, and thus made citizens of the 
Republic. Equality of citizenship and the ensuing benefits of French civilization are two of 
the ideological pillars upon which the French republican model is based. The application of 
these principles in Algeria succeeded in transforming an overseas colony into an integral part 
of France and served as an example of successful republican colonization with one caveat, 
the advantages of republican assimilation were never successfully extended to the Muslims 
of Algeria. 
 According to the Republic oriented histories of Algeria by Ageron and Julien, the 
major political event of the 1930s was the debate over the Viollette project, a legal reform 
that would have granted 30,000 Algerian Muslims voting status equal to that accorded to all 
French males.4 In May 1936, a coalition of left and moderate parties defeated the right in 
elections in France. This “Popular Front” was elected in response to increasing anxiety over 
fascism in Europe, but its victory also promised a wave of changes for France and Algeria. 
For Algeria, the Viollette project was the newly elected Popular Front government’s attempt 
to extend the principle of the republican civilizing mission and end the status of legal 
inferiority obstructing Muslims’ ability to participate in republican democracy. The measure 
                                                 
4Ageron concludes his second section of Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine with the collapse of the Muslim 
Congress and the abandonment of the Viollette bill, pp. 433-464. Mahfoud Kaddache also discusses the 
Viollette project but endeavors to fill in the gaps left by the historiography of Algeria which is dominated by 
authors of European origin. Kaddache’s primary focus regarding political development is the ENA and Messali 
Hadj. Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien (Paris: Paris-Méditerranée, 1980). 
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intended to extend citizenship to Muslims with 15 years of military service, secondary 
diplomas, or government citations for military or civic service. The measure would also 
make citizens of Muslim government functionaries and elected officials. 5 When, in 
December 1936, the government announced that the project would be considered for 
approval, Muslim politicians and social elites, those principally affected by the proposed 
legislation, called for a Muslim Congress to support the project and campaign for its 
implementation. The Muslim Congress support for the government’s legislation was not 
rewarded, as the bill stalled in the Senate and the reform was abandoned.  
 Despite the failure of the Viollette project, the Muslim Congress is considered by 
mainstream histories to be an early example of Algerian unity and precursor to popular 
nationalism. The authors of these histories lament what they interpret as a failure by the 
Republic to include Muslims. Despite his criticism of Ageron and Julien, Jean-Claude Vatin 
confirms this interpretation. He states that shock of this experience irreparably damaged the 
European liberals and Muslim partisans of assimilation, leading to a turn to extremism. 6 
These histories, with their interpretation of the Viollette project as a failure of the Popular 
Front, assume that Muslim leadership was desirous of republican assimilation. While the 
Muslim Congress did at one point unite a diverse range of interests behind the idea of 
integration with the Republic, the standard interpretations of the Viollette drama conflate 
Muslim support of the Popular Front government with faith in republican assimilation. Yet, 
both before and after the support professed by the Muslim Congress for the government of 
                                                 
5The eventual law proposed would grant citizenship for around 30,000 Muslims, meaning that Muslims meeting 
a range of possible criteria; including possession of a school diploma, an honorable discharge as a non 
commissioned officer from the military, a military decoration, or a pension for state service, would be 
considered a French citizen, Mahfoud Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien (Paris: Paris-
Méditerranée), 407. 
 
6Vatin, L’Algérie politique histoire et société, 161. 
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the Republic, members of the Congress advocated anti-assimilation philosophies and 
strongly criticized the republican model of integration.  
While Muslims may not have refused a republican model of politics, they did reject 
the model of assimilation associated with the republican government. Their allies in this 
struggle both before and after the Muslim Congress were the anti-republican parties of the 
European settlers. These groups shared an ideological foundation in political movements that 
for one reason or another rejected the Republic, often over religious objections to the 
secularism of the French Republic or a commitment to an authoritarian monarchy. These 
anti-republican groups, often, though not always, employed a strategy of popular anti-
Semitism to promote their campaigns. As enthusiasm for authoritarian government grew 
following the rise of fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, these anti-republicans organized 
new political parties. Two of these new parties, the Croix de Feu and the Parti Populaire 
Français, spread to Algeria and developed important followings among both the European 
settlers and Muslim Algerians, while Action Française, a royalist organization focused 
around the newspaper of the same name, reached a new audience in Muslim politicians.7 
Sources 
 Much of our information on Muslim political attitudes comes to us from the Muslim 
press which was printed and distributed primarily in the urban centers of Algiers and 
Constantine. These weekly and monthly papers, published in French in order to evade the 
strict censorship of Arabic language press, reached only the tiny minority of Muslims literate 
                                                 
7The major accounts of the extreme right in France do not account for the place of Algeria in the formation of 
anti-republican ideology or practices. See, Robert Soucy, French Fascism: the second wave, 1933-1939 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) and René Remond, The Right Wing in France: From 1815 to de Gaulle 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966). For Muslims and Action Française see footnote 36. A 
Muslim paper named Action Algérienne opened offices in Paris and presumably followed the Action Française 
model.  
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in French. Though many newspapers started and failed within one year, four of the Muslim 
papers printed in French achieved stability: La Défense, La Justice, L’Entente Franco-
Musulmane and La Voix Indigène.8 This press was the principle method of communication 
among urban elites educated in French schools and in religious centers located in Tunisia and 
Egypt. Members of a federation of elected representatives, known as the Élus, and the 
Society of Ulemas, religious scholars inspired by Wahabist doctrine, formed the core of the 
Algerian intelligentsia.9 While these two groups sparred over the proper degree of 
assimilation into French cultural norms, each strived for acceptance by the French. The 
Ulemas campaigned for state sponsored bilingual education and official recognition of 
Islamic cultural practices; the Élus, as urban professionals, sought an end to official and 
unofficial barriers to Muslim advancement. This Muslim press has been of interest to 
historians as they provide an insight into political groups interested in dialoging with the state 
and consequently those seeking entry to the Republic.  
 The limited scope of these sources leads one to believe that all Muslims sought, to 
one degree or another, acceptance by the French Republic. The only active political group 
employing the press with an anti-inclusion philosophy was the Etoile Nord Africaine founded 
by Algerian workers in Paris. Its leader, Messali Hadj, rejected French domination over 
Algeria and advocated alternately for independence or autonomy. Sources outside the press 
tell a story different than the struggle for acceptance recorded in the Muslim press. Police 
                                                 
8Two other newspapers deserve mention. La Lutte Sociale was the Algerian Communist paper which was 
reviewed by the Indigenous Affairs office despite its European ownership and direction. It published bi-lingual 
editions and employed numerous Muslim authors. Also, El Ouma was the ENA/PPA press originating in Paris. 
This press was considered foreign to Algeria despite its focus on Algeria and Algerian issues.  
 
9While little has been written about these groups outside their role in the development of Algerian nationalist 
politics, Fanny Colonna has argued that these Ulema need to be examined in the context of their religious 
movement. Fanny Colonna, “Cultural Resistance and Religious Legitimacy in Colonial Algeria”, in Islam in 
Tribal Societies: From the Atlas to the Indus, eds. Akbar Ahmed and David Hart (London: Routledge, 1984), 
233-251. 
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reports and colonial government surveillance reports preserved in the overseas archives now 
located in Aix en Province detail another approach to political participation outside the 
sphere of the Francophone press directed to Muslim Algerians. In January 1935, the 
Governor General of Algeria established a new service for gathering information on northern 
Algeria, as information gathering to this point was concentrated in the southern territories 
still governed by the military. The Centre d’information et d’études, despite its innocuous 
name, was responsible for gathering and analyzing information on developments in Muslim 
society. The CIE employed careful monitoring of the press as well as covert police 
surveillance to scrutinize Muslim political activities. While analysis focused on detecting 
potential threats to French rule, the CIE recorded and preserved extensive information on a 
variety of Muslim politicians.10 Additionally, CIE review of the Muslim press starting the 
year before the election that brought the Popular Front to power reveals longstanding anti-
government frustration which often overlapped with the anti-republican frustration of 
Europeans. Examining this Muslim resentment reveals that while the standard histories of 
Algeria portray anti-republican agitation among Muslims as opportunism, Muslim support 
for the Popular Front’s program for reform was in fact the opportunistic turn.  
 
 
                                                 
10Many of these archives have only been opened within the past twenty years.   
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Origins in the Right 
 Before the Popular Front took power in 1936, the Muslim press was highly critical of 
the Republic and its exploitation of Algeria. Muslim newspapers were very careful to remain 
pro-French while disparaging the government that represented France in Algeria. These 
journalists targeted the Algerian Government General located in Algiers, prefects in Oran 
and Constantine, and the staff of Muslim functionaries managing religious sites and 
communal property. Until the assumption of governing power in Algeria by the Popular 
Front, Muslim journalists poured scorn on the functionaries executing the Republic’s policy 
in Algeria.  
 In 1930, the French Government General of Algeria observe its centennial in 
triumphal fashion, marking the important dates of conquest with military parades that 
Muslims found humiliating. In response to this perceived slight, educated Muslims began 
their own press campaign to balance the celebratory tone of the government. In addition to a 
range of new histories that marginalized the French conquest and highlighted its brutality, the 
columns of the Muslim press generally featured an extended faits divers column which 
spotlighted stories of government corruption and mismanagement. Such attacks on the 
government and the historical foundations of French Algeria brought Muslim notables, 
especially representatives from the Élus, but also members of the Association of Ulemas, to 
the attention of government censors attentive to any apparent case of sedition. In order to 
avoid suppression or jail time, these Muslim publicists turned to their counterparts on the 
French anti-republican right for a model of opposition propaganda.    
 10 
Oppositional press 
The parties of the anti-republican right had not pioneered the art of polemical press 
but had certainly gone a long way towards perfecting a technique which challenged the limits 
of government tolerance. René Remond described two outlets of the anti-republican right in 
the twentieth century: “Street demonstrations and polemics by a newspaper press lying in 
wait for scandals, prompt to exploit them, and ready if necessary to invent them.”11 Muslim 
publicists copied this model with their frequent mention of government scandals and in some 
cases borrowed from the indignation of scandals uncovered by the anti-republican press in 
Paris for their own use in Algeria.  
La Défense, La Justice, L’Entente, and La Voix Indigène  all faced constant 
government suspicions and methodically approached and sought to extend the line beyond 
which their publications could be censured and distribution stopped.12 Again they borrowed 
from the anti-republican model when defending their positions against critics. In an article 
appearing on 18 May 1934, Mohammed Benhoura, then editor at La Défense, acknowledges 
the difficulties faced by the Muslim press and offers a justification for the decision to write in 
French.13 He credits the increasing government censorship of Arabic language newspapers 
and above all a willful misinterpretation of the Arabic language by government translators 
for mistaking Muslim appeals for justice with demands for independence. In the article 
                                                 
11Rémond, The Right Wing in France, 215. 
 
12The 15H series in the Centre d’archives d’outre mer contains numerous requests for information from officials 
in Tunisia and Morocco regarding the Algerian press, especially concerning the more polemical La Défense and 
La Justice. These requests demonstrate a certain curiosity among administrators in other French territories that 
such papers are allowed to operate in Algeria, indicating that the press laws in Algeria may have been more 
tolerant. A report in carton 15H20 from the director of the Department of Indigenous Affairs explains that 
despite certain questionable articles, given the fact that the papers are published in France, and the editors are 
often French citizens, legal action is difficult except in the gravest circumstances. Letter of 23 January 1935, 
from Jules Carde to the Resident General in Rabat. 
 
13
 La Défense, 18 May 1934. 
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Benhoura, under the alias Abdoulhak, writes, “haven’t we chosen the French language in 
order that our writings might be weighed, judged and understood by exactly those whom we 
are addressing?...We write in French solely to permit the French of Algeria and of France to 
come to an understanding of the true situation which we are in, and the injurious rumors of 
which we are the object.” Failing to mention the press laws which extended greater 
protection to publications written in French, Benhoura professes the most correct loyalty to 
France, even as he energetically criticizes the government in Algiers. For Benhoura the 
Muslim elite write in French so that they can expose to the good French public the 
transgressions of the Algerian administration that “trembles to see the Government [in 
France] and the French people informed of their terrible exploits.”14 Benhoura casts his role 
as a defender of French honor, pitting good French values against the corruption of the 
government.  
In a special issue appearing just before the separate Muslim municipal elections on 12 
May 1935, La Justice ran in bold print a headline reading, “Down with the Staviskys!”15 At 
this important moment, and a full year after the February riots that saw anti-republican 
demonstrators bring down the government in Paris, the allusions to the rally cry of the anti-
republican right would have been clear to contemporary observers. The case of government 
corruption linked to Alexandar Stavisky served as a lightning rod for indignation with the 
republican government. Following the affair in Paris, writers for La Défense and L’Entente 
quickly employed the language of the anti-republican right when criticizing the Government 
General, and those Muslims they felt were compromised by the administration. The use of 
                                                 
14Ibid. 
 
15An undated special edition of La Justice, though we can speculate it appeared on either 10 May or 11 May 
1935. 
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“Staviskite” by La Justice on the eve of Muslim elections to discredit other Muslim leaders is 
indicative of the penetration of the model of the anti-republican right in the language of the 
Muslim press. 
La Défense and La Justice were singled out for special consideration by government 
monitors for their particularly vivid and often violent criticisms of Government General 
polices. Mohammed Benhoura, who also wrote under the names, Abdoulhak and Veritas, 
was prone to tirades against Judeo-Masonic treachery and relied on anti-Semitic statements 
to shape his criticisms of the government. His paper, La Justice ran the bold Stavisky 
headline already mentioned, and in another piece appearing in La Défense vilifies a 
government functionary as a, “Jewish Staviskiard”, inherently prejudiced against Muslims.16 
While Benhoura was content to copy the language of the anti-republicans, borrowing from 
their scandals and mimicking their style of anti-Semitism attacks against government 
officials, another publicist working at La Défense criticized the Republic’s civilizing mission 
explicitly.  
Henri Bernier is, unfortunately, a bit of a mystery. A French Catholic working as a 
featured publicist at a Muslim newspaper, his columns are noted for both their anticipation of 
future Muslim politics but also for their unmistakable criticism of the French place in 
Algeria. The Muslim Congress in many ways seems to be a product of his consistent 
suggestions for the creation of an all Muslim political party. Bernier praised the role of 
religion in politics and in many places seems to regret the absence of faith among French of 
the Metropole. In regard to the assimilation of Muslims by the  
French Republic on 21 December 1934 he wrote,  
                                                 
16Veritas, ‘‘Les dessous d’une rafale’’, La Défense, 23 February 1935 
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“The Muslim people of Algeria, Arab or Kabyle, are not ready for 
such an intimate fusion with the neo-French [pied-noir] of this colony, who 
must be content, for a long time to come, with bordellos and cat houses for 
their extra-conjugal  affairs. But, in conserving their [Muslim people] morals, 
their  customs, their  ancestral ways, (not to mention their women), they will 
collaborate with the Mère Patrie as equals….thus is created a people, dualistic 
by religion and by civilization, but united by the same affection for France.”17  
 
This rejection of the republican mission, and its vilification through sexualized terms, recalls 
the same linguistic strategies of the anti-republican right who referred to the Republic as, 
“the slut”. 
While not shy about using incendiary vocabulary to criticize the administration, the 
writers representing the Élus and Ulemas were fearful of being interpreted as Algerian 
nationalists, a judgment which would result in their papers being shut down. In an effort to 
emphasize the patriotism of even those Muslims critical of the administration, on 4 March 
1935 La Justice reprinted an interview from L’Action française conducted  by Pierre 
Héricourt, a prominent figure in the anti-republican right. The interview between Héricourt 
and a member of the Élus focused on the questions of Franco-Algerian union and Muslim 
naturalization. Héricourt, playing the role of devil’s advocate, quizzed the Muslim delegate 
on his nationalist sentiments, receiving the response at every question that Muslims feel that 
they are French, and could never be anything but. While Héricourt confesses some doubt 
over the Muslim belief that the ability to send representatives to Paris could ever solve their 
problems, entirely consistent with his anti-parliamentary position, the interview concludes 
with Héricourt asking, “So, I can affirm that you harbor no hostile feelings toward France,” 
to which the Muslim delegate responded, “absolutely, say just that.” Here a Muslim elected 
delegate agreed to be interviewed by a famous anti-republican newspaper to demonstrate 
their loyalty to France. While the two men may not specifically agree over parliamentary 
                                                 
17Henri Bernier, “Carmelo”, La Défense, 21 December 1934. 
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democracy, the interview is an example of how the Muslim Élus were able to use the right to 
make demands of the French government without rejecting France.  
The Muslim Press had a specific interest in covering their anti-government critiques 
with an aura of patriotism and civic duty as a veneer of pro-French sentiment protected their 
speech from unwanted scrutiny by the police. Though the Muslim press drew on articles 
from left and right to fill out their columns, after the riots of Constantine on 5 August 1934 
which resulted in the deaths of 23 Jewish men, women, and children, the Muslim press was 
forced to rely on the anti-republican right to legitimize their positions.  
The reaction to Constantine 
Immediately following the violence, Larmine Lamoudi, owner and publisher of La 
Défense, promised his readers an investigatory trip to Constantine to uncover the truth of the 
riot. Lamoudi’s subsequent report acknowledged the murders of Jewish families, but 
attributed the cause to aggression by Jewish men who then fled, leaving their families to 
answer for their crimes. Lamoudi acknowledged the excessive force used by the Muslim 
participants, yet managed to absolve the perpetrators by appealing to the motive of self-
defense. In subsequent issues of La Défense, Lamoudi endeavored to lay out the long term 
factors which explained the violence between Muslims and Jews. He blamed Jews for a long 
history of daily oppression of poor Muslims. In the months following the Constantine riots, 
Lamoudi vented anti-Jewish judgments on the front page of every edition of La Défense.  In 
these pages, Lamoudi accused the Jews of Constantine of using their political influence to 
deny rights to Muslims in order to keep them in servitude. Lamoudi reported inflammatory 
stories concerning Jewish treatment of Muslim servants. In these accounts, the Jewish 
families of Constantine called all their domestic servants either Mohammad or Fatima, 
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insisted that Muslim domestics refer to their Jewish employers as master, and forced their 
female maids to serve as concubines to keep their wayward sons at home rather than see 
them wander the streets.18 Lamoudi attributed full responsibility for the deaths to “excessive 
Jewish pride” and a Jewish desire to keep Muslims in servitude. 19  Rather than attempting to 
calm tensions between the two communities, Lamoudi seemed content to absolve Muslims of 
any responsibility for the Constantine riots in a formula that indicated that the Jewish dead 
deserved their fate. This inflammatory anti-Semitism would seem to confirm Robert Attal’s 
explanation that the riots resulted from the anti-republican right’s exploitation of Muslim 
hatred of Jew, however, the similarities between the anti-republican right’s public reaction to 
the riot and the accounts provided by La Défense and other Muslim newspapers indicates that 
anger towards the government’s policy of assimilation was the root concern for both 
groups.20 
The Muslim press turned to the anti-republican right for support in absolving 
Muslims for responsibility in the August attacks. However, this press campaign copied from 
the European papers avoided the crass anti-Semitism La Défense printed directly after the 
riots and instead focused on the role of the Republic in creating the conditions for violence. 
On 14 Septepber 1934, an article from l’Action française entitled “The bloody riots of 
Constantine” was abstracted in its entirety in La Défense. Below the title was added “the 
responsibility of the Jews.”21 While the article from l’Action française attributes the 
immediate cause for the eruption of violence to a group of Jewish shoppers, the ultimate 
                                                 
18
 La Défense, 2 November 1934.  
 
19Ibid. 
 
20Robert Attal, Les émûtes de Constantine (Paris, Romillat, 2002). 
 
21La Défense, 14 September 1934. 
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blame is attributed to a disastrous policy resulting from the Crémieux decree which had given 
the indigenous North African Jewish population the right to vote while leaving the Muslims 
of Algeria powerless. L’Eclair, a European anti-republican paper based in Algeria, called on 
the government to abandon its disastrous policy of favoring, “60,000 inassimilable Jews, 
French only through the ignominy of Crémieux, over six million devoted Indigènes.” The 
message in the article is clear: unless the situation is resolved it [the violence] will resume.22 
La Voix Indigène published a similar account of the Constantine riots that placed blame on 
the mismanagement by the republican government that promoted the indigenous Jewish 
population over the Algerian Muslims: “The exasperation of which our Israelite brothers 
were victims was provoked by something, desperation. We [Muslims] were brought to the 
point where the smallest pinprick was transformed quickly into the spark that provoked the 
catastrophe. The explosion of Constantine obliges the Metropole to consider the state of mind 
of the Algerian Muslim population so that further incidents might be avoided.”23 While still 
anti-Jewish, both the anti-republican press and the majority of the indigenous Muslim press 
avoided crass anti-Semitism offered by Lamoudi and in place presented a critique of the 
government’s policy of assimilation.  
Despite a demonstrated willingness to find inspiration and moral justification in the 
press of the French anti-republican right, only a few articles provide hints of active 
cooperation between representatives of the anti-republican right and politicians active in 
Algeria. The opening of a Muslim chapter of the anti-republican league, Croix de Feu, is 
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enthusiastically announced in one edition of La Justice.24 In an article of L’Entente, Ferhat 
Abbas, a member of the federation of Élus, lukewarmly denies a government charge of 
association with the same group.25 However, government surveillance reports indicate that 
the same Muslim notables, along with others uninvolved in the press, were putting words into 
action and capitalizing on cooperation with the anti-republican right in an effort to gain 
power in the government of Algeria.  
The right opens new doors 
One individual, who we have already encountered, undeniably jumped into the anti-
republican camp in both word and deed in the year before the success of the Popular Front 
government. Mohammed Benhoura was very active in the Muslim political scene as a 
publicist noted for the violent tone of his polemics. Benhoura, once editor at La Défense in 
cooperation with Larmine Lamoudi, branched out to found his own publication, La Justice, 
when the two fought over the financial direction of La Défense.26 A police report of a 
gathering chaired by Benhoura in November of 1934 mentions that the meeting concluded 
early, due in part to another meeting, this one with the “President of the Croix de Feu?”, at 
which Benhoura was expected.27  
                                                 
24
 La Justice 1 January 1935. 
 
25L’Entente Franco-Musulmane 12 September 1935. « Je n’a pas à juger le groupement ‘Croix de Feu’ ni à dire 
s’il fait ou s’il fait pas de la politique anti-sémitique. C’est son affaire et je suppose qu’il est prêt à supporter la 
responsabilité de son position”. 
 
2615H20, A report from the head of the departmental security services describes a number of physical 
altercations between Benhoura and Lamoudi in December of 1934 over failing finances after which no articles 
appeared under any of Benhoura’s pseudonyms. After this event he is reported to have traveled the territory 
extensively to drum up support for La Justice. Report from the Chef de la Sûreté départementale to the directeur 
des Affaires Indigènes, 25 January 1935. 
 
2715H20, Report from the directeur de la sécurité générale de l’Algérie to the directeur des Affaires Indigènes, 
29 November 1934. It is unclear if the author of the report placed a question mark following this phrase based 
on uncertainty over who Benhoura meant by “President of the Croix de Feu”, or over surprise at the meeting 
itself. 
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 By piecing various police documents together we get a clear indication that Benhoura 
was at this time looking for a new angle with which to sell his newspaper and it was to the 
Croix de Feu that he turned for help. Throughout the summer of 1935 Benhoura toured the 
department delivering conferences of a distinctly anti-Semitic nature. In Algiers he lectured 
on the dangers of “Judeo-Masonic collusion”. The report from the town of Bordj, near the 
city of Setif, indicates that Benhoura categorized “Israelites” as liars and deceitful as he 
invoked the massacre in nearby Constantine and claimed to be “with” the Croix de Feu 
against the Franc-Masons.28 Whether or not Benhoura believed what he said, he employed a 
vigorous anti-Semitic language while referencing the name and program of the Croix de Feu 
as he toured the country to promote his new paper. 
 Apart from capitalizing on the repercussions of anti-Semitism resulting from the 
Constantine riots, Benhoura had other reasons for choosing and for being accepted into the 
ranks of the Croix de Feu. A well informed government report from the CIE gives an 
interesting appraisal of the Croix de Feu, that while questionable for its sweeping 
characterization of Arab and Berber “mindsets”, advances the theory that the group’s 
popularity among the Muslim masses stemmed from its martial image and flashy parades. 
The report goes on to claim that Croix de Feu propaganda among Muslim voters increased 
significantly in the months before the European municipal elections of May 1935, resulting 
in substantial gains for the party and several victories for Croix de Feu candidates. According 
to the document, the Croix de Feu achieved their propaganda success through the medium of 
Muslim cadres drawn from former soldiers.29 Mohammed Benhoura, it should be noted, 
volunteered in 1914, earned the Croix de Guerre, was captured and imprisoned by the 
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Germans, and had refused to aid in the German propaganda efforts directed toward other 
Muslim soldiers.30 Benhoura was the perfect candidate for the Croix de Feu’s efforts and the 
CIE report shows that the Croix de Feu was actively recruiting among the Élus and Ulemas.  
 Benhoura’s motive was likely increased notoriety and the consequential financial 
gains for his paper. However, the same report from the CIE gives several other reasons for 
which Muslim notables could support the Croix de Feu. One reason given is the chance that 
once ensconced in office, the Croix de Feu might act on some of the Muslim demands.31 The 
CIE also concluded that “the intellectuals and neo-Wahabites were searching for any way to 
dislodge Jewish influence in certain towns”. And finally the report notes that a link to the 
Croix de Feu provides an air of loyalty and civism to those fearful of being cast as anti-
French or communist. While it is not entirely clear that the Muslims referenced truly wished 
to replace the Republic with an authoritarian leader like the Croix de Feu’s demagogic 
Colonel de La Rocque, they did use anti-republican critics to aid in disparaging the same 
governmental abuses and the Jewish functionaries whom they held as responsible. Muslim 
politicians employed affiliation with the anti-republican right in order to force open the door 
to political power.  
The Croix de Feu appealed to politically active Muslims and several notable 
politicians were attached to the anti-republican right before the arrival of the Popular Front. 
One Muslim elected to the municipal council in the 12 May 1935 elections was 
Abderrhamane Boukerdenna, a known member of Action françaiase. Additionally, Ferhat 
Abbas and Mohammed Bendjelloul were rumored by the administration to have risen to 
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31The debate that followed one of Benhoura’s anti-Semitic conferences indicates that in at least one 
municipality, the Croix de Feu had already voted more money to Muslim education.  
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prominence through their association with the Croix de Feu.32 Noting that it is nearly 
impossible to know the number of Muslim members in the Croix de Feu, the CIE report 
estimates the total for the department of Algiers at nearly 1000. However, by the summer of 
1936, this number evaporated into nearly nothing as the Popular Front won control in Paris 
and the leaders of the Élus and Ulemas swung definitively into the government camp.  
In the year before the election of the Popular Front, the Muslim elite was divided in 
its allegiances to French political parties. While I have attempted to demonstrate that many 
looked to the anti-republican right for support, many also supported the Parti Communiste 
[PC]. The governing center offered nothing attractive to Muslims in Algeria prior to 1936 
and both the PC and the anti-republican right offered a means for Muslims to criticize the 
government. The Muslim leadership adopted a more conciliatory tone towards the 
administration in Algiers only after the victory of the Popular Front. Nonetheless, despite 
their future endorsement of the Popular Front and its Communist members, figures like 
Larmine Lamoudi, Ferhat Abbas, Mohammed Benhoura, all who played large roles in the 
Muslim Congress, chose to associate with the anti-republican right rather than with the 
Communist left.  
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The Muslim Congress 
When the Popular Front came to power in the spring of 1936, the centerpiece of its 
legislation for North Africa was the Viollette project for electoral reform. The Popular Front 
appeared to offer a real prospect for change in a decade dominated by stalemated politics. 
The Muslim leaders in Algiers and Constantine backed off their verbal attacks against the 
government and discouraged their followers from engaging in any nationalist displays, 
prudently waiting to see which way the wind would blow. In the summer of 1936 
representatives from all urban Muslim political groups were invited by Dr. Bendjelloul, the 
leader of the Élus of Constantine, to participate in a Muslim Congress to defend Muslim 
interests and lobby for reform. Excluded were the ENA and its leader Messali Hadj, who, 
despite being the most recognizable leader of Muslims living in France, was barred from 
attending the Congress on the grounds that his platform called for independence rather than 
accommodation with the Popular Front government. The Muslim Congress represented the 
realization of a longstanding objective of forming a Muslim party capable of uniting Muslim 
interests against colonial exploitation.33 While the original concept for a united party 
envisioned a defense of Muslim society against the inroads of the Government General, The 
Congress’s actual composition indicated its commitment to accommodation with the Popular 
Front government.  
This commitment to integration is manifested by the inclusion in the Congress of the 
Algerian Communist Party. Fearing the increasing threat of fascism the PC no longer 
demanded the complete independence of Algeria and instead focused on strengthening 
France and the Soviet Union in preparation for an impending conflict. As a partner in the 
                                                 
33The Frenchman Bernier was one of the first to lobby strongly for this.  
 22 
Popular Front government, and an organization with many Muslim members, the PCA 
occupied a central role in the direction of the Muslim Congress as an intermediary between 
the Congress and the governing coalition in Paris. For the first six months of the Congress, 
Muslims all over Algeria abandoned their old allies on the right and looked to the rising 
fortunes of the Popular Front and the Muslim Congress. Those unwilling to accept the 
change were cajoled, then isolated. Publicists like Larmine Lamoudi, the first president of the 
Muslim Congress, employed the full weight of their papers to impose an internal discipline 
and to keep the Congress together. As the Popular Front increasingly defaulted on its 
promises and began to resemble the previous government in its failure to respond to Muslim 
demands and its decision to imprison outspoken Algerian leaders, its new supporters quickly 
reversed course and sought to associate with the anti-republican right, at this point the only 
group able to assert strong anti-government credentials.34 
Faith in the Popular Front 
It was only in the months running up to the elections in the spring of 1936 that 
Muslim publicists began to change their position with regard to the parties of the left. Prior to 
the elections that swept the Popular Front into power, La Défense, L’Entente, and La Voix 
Indigène all demonstrated careful neutrality. In February of 1936 L’Entente asserted that, 
“despite a few nuances, they [the anti-republican right and the Popular Front] are both 
colonizers.”35 The papers representing the major figures of the Élus and the Ulemas were 
hesitant to choose sides. This reluctance can be seen in the account given in La Défense 
following one of Benhoura’s anti-Semitic speeches on the dangers of Judeo-Masonry. The 
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3515H1, Article cited appeared in L’Entente Franco-Musulman, 20 Febuary 1935.  
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police report of the event relates that partisans of the left and right both attempted to take 
over the podium with shrill denunciations of their opponents. Some attempted to read from 
copies of L’Action française while others applauded the actions of the ENA and the left. In 
its 2 August 1935 issue, La Défense responded to this chaotic political climate and cautioned 
readers to abstain from such demonstrations of partisanship, counseling them to be, “Simply, 
with the French, who are filled with the best feelings for our cause, whether they are from the 
left or right, whether they are a Jew, a Catholic or a Franc-Mason.” 36 Ferhat Abbas expressed 
a similar attitude in a L’Entente article dating from 26 March 1936 where he asserts that 
Muslim Élus should know how to remain in the opposition while “refusing to be the men of 
one party, so that they are able to negotiate with all.”37  
 As the notable Muslim politicians waited out the struggle between the French left and 
right, other less influential politicians jettisoned their former allies for new associations on 
the left. A routine report from the department of Indigenous Affairs providing background 
information on one Cadi Abdelkader notes that he rose to prominence by ingratiating himself 
with the anti-republican group Front Paysan, a group linked to Action Française, only to 
abandon this group following the Popular Front victory and began work with the Socialists, 
going as far as to have himself elected vice-president of a regional agricultural union.38  
Before the elections, Mohammed Benhoura directed his Muslim readers to support the 
Popular Front, as “only the socialo-communistes hear their complaints”39  
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 Following the victory of the Popular Front, The Élus and Ulemas held the first 
meeting of the Muslim Congress in July of 1936. Despite past professions of neutrality, the 
Congress adopted a stance supportive of the Popular Front, offering favorable appraisals in 
their press and defending government officials. In June of 1936, La Voix Indigène published 
an article ensuring Muslims that they were right to place their faith in the Popular Front, 
though the author alluded to some reservations about the long-term prosperity of a union 
between Communists and Muslims and noted that other friends may yet be found elsewhere. 
La Défense wrote in the same month that the interests of Muslims were definitively oriented 
to the left following the victory in the May elections.40 In an article from 8 August 1936 
Benhoura concludes with “Long live the Popular Front government”. The same month the 
leader of the Ulemas, BenBadis, was quoted in the PCA newspaper, La Lutte Sociale, as 
stating, “Our sympathies are held by the Popular Front, to which we are linked in life or 
death.”41 
Silencing Dissent  
Even as figures such as Lamoudi and BenBadis threw their support behind the 
Viollette project and the Popular Front government, a significant number of Muslim notables 
openly criticized the course of collaboration undertaken by the Congress.  In response, the 
publicists affiliated with the Ulemas and the Élus attempted to marginalize any Muslim 
politician who deviated from the Congress position.  
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Messali Hadj rejected the Viollette project as a half step, and a measure which would 
ultimately hinder Algerian autonomy and another example of divide and conquer.42 As 
Messali’s vision of an independent Algeria developed, he came into conflict with his former 
patrons, the Communist party, which had moved from an anti-colonial position to a stance 
advocating incorporating Algeria with France. Messali’s refusal to endorse the Viollette plan 
and his open hostility towards the Communists led the Ulemas and Élus to direct a vigorous 
campaign to limit ENA influence in Algeria.  
It was Messali’s indisputable status as a figure of opposition that led to his growing 
popularity. The Ulemas and Élus responded by banning any member of their organization 
who associated with Messali or expressed ENA sympathies. Said Zahiri, a founding member 
of the Association of Ulemas and one of the few notables from the Oranais, was expelled 
from the organization for associations with the ENA/PPA in September 1936.43 Both the Élus 
and Ulemas were quick to ostracize any of their members who criticized either the legislation 
of the Popular Front or openly disapproved of the participation of the European left, notably 
the Communists, in the Muslim Congress.  
 Doctor Bendjelloul, the leading member of the federation of Élus in Constantine, and 
one of the most prominent politicians in Algeria during the decade, was himself removed 
from the Muslim Congress and attacked by the mainstream press for criticizing the role 
assigned to the Communists. Apparently, his was not the only reservation. In an article 
announcing the founding of the Muslim Congress, the PCA newspaper, La Lutte Sociale, 
commented that, “Great efforts must now be made. These consist of maintaining the union 
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established and eliminating the regrettable prejudices that certain militants hold towards the 
worker militants.”44 Evidently not everyone was convinced of the suitability of the 
Communists as political allies. Cracks were beginning to show in the Muslim Congress, 
especially concerning the inability of the Muslim Congress leadership, now controlled by the 
Ulemas, to demonstrate the compatibility of the PCA. By October 1936 new publications, 
sponsored by non-Ulema religious associations, appeared in Algeria and relied on quotes 
from the Koran to demonstrate the fundamental incompatibility of Islam with Communism. 
Others reproduced articles from rightist European papers like Le Matin published in Algiers, 
“exposing the destructive impact of communist propaganda”.45 
 In order to respond to these attacks, La Défense and La Lutte Sociale linked concerns 
about communism to ties with Fascism. In La Lutte Sociale, “Bendjelloul can count on the 
adhesion of the nationalist parties, with the Ferhats, the Boukerdennas, the Bentamis, the 
Mekkis, and the Zine Bentabets; with them will be the residents of the countryside, the 
Zaouias, the Marabouts and the nationalist colons.46 This passage links the older perceived 
enemies of the Ulemas, the Sufi brotherhoods and the Marabouts, with their new enemies, 
those who question the Popular Front and the Muslim Congress. At the same time an article 
in La Défense assured Muslim solidarity “in the combat against the common enemy, 
Fascism.”47 While La Lutte Sociale and La Défense were busy isolating their immediate 
                                                 
4415H1, Affaires Indigènes report on the press, Lutte Sociale 15 July 1936. 
 
4515H1, Affaires Indigènes report on the press, 15 September to 30 September 1936. En Nadjah 27 September. 
Affaires Indigènes report on the press, 1 October  to 15 October 1936, Sidi Henini 3 October 1936. Sidi Henini 
also criticized the Ulemas for not being as anti-Semitic as they should be.  
 
4615H1, Affaires Indigènes report on the press, La Lutte Sociale, 7 October 1936. Though Ferhat is one of the 
names appearing in the list, I doubt it refers to Ferhat Abbas. At this point Abbas seems to have taken over 
leadership of the Élus remaining with the Muslim Congress. 
 
47La Défense, 11 November 1936. 
 27 
enemies, the religious leaders of the Ulemas, BenBadis and El Okbi, were reassuring their 
readers that Communism held no direct challenge for Islam and that finally, a government 
sympathetic to the plight of pious Muslims was ready to make redress.48  
 The press exchanges followed this pattern through the fall and into the next year with 
La Justice, La Défense, and La Lutte Sociale rebuking Bendjelloul and Messali while the 
Ulemas defended their cooperation with the Communists, the Popular Front and the Viollette 
project. However, by the spring, patience was running out and leading up to the first 
anniversary of the Congress, the propaganda campaign designed to isolate dissenters had 
succeeded only in fragmenting the tenuous alliances holding the Congress together. 
Lamoudi’s refusal to suspend his vigorous opposition to an important ally of BenBadis, and 
as a result was removed as the president of the Muslim Congress. Growing doubts over the 
compatibility of Islam and Communism began to split the strongest knot holding together the 
Muslim Congress, the Ulemas and the Communists.  Without the unified support of the 
Ulemas, the Congress lost its moral authority and support for the Popular Front dwindled. 
The rapid swing to the left in the wake of the Popular Front victory slowly reversed itself and 
military officials in the territory began to wonder which side the Muslims would fight for if 
war broke out between France and Germany. 49 
Declining confidence in the Popular Front can be seen as early as April 1937. In a 
speech given by Cheikh El Okbi in the presence of a government official, the prominent 
Ulema indicated his frustration with the lack of achievement by the Popular Front in stating, 
“If we were more frivolous, we might find what we are looking for with Mussolini, Franco, 
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or Mustapha Kemal who all solicit the friendship of Muslims.”50 Not only did increasing 
numbers of Muslims speculate on different possible partnerships, like the public threats of El 
Okbi, but a large number of the leaders of the Muslim Congress drifted away from the 
Popular Front and connected with new elements from the anti-republican right or with 
Messali’s Parti Populaire Algérien [PPA], the two parties most openly opposing the 
government.  
The signs of transformation are abundant in the police surveillance from the period. 
Agents were again reporting on expulsions from Muslim groups for communist or socialist 
associations. Propaganda from Germany and Italy spread through the ranks of Muslim 
soldiers and found new life in the pages of Muslim papers. Finally, Messali Hadj reconciled 
with members of the Élus and Ulemas and brought them into the orbit of the pan-Arab 
movement, which was hostile to France, and beholden to German financial support. As the 
unity of the Muslim Congress collapsed and faith in the Popular Front faded, Muslim 
politicians looked for new allies. Though the old parties of the anti-republican right, namely 
the Croix de Feu and L’Action Française were no longer serious contenders in Algerian 
politics, new anti-republican political parties were eager to welcome those Muslims 
frustrated by the promises of the republican government.  
The Congress Collapses 
One of the first major politicians to criticize the participation of communists in the 
Muslim Congress and re-emerge as a leader on the right was Mohammed Bendjelloul, the 
most widely recognized Muslim politician in eastern Algeria.  Following his complaints, the 
executive committee expelled him. This led to a power struggle which would see a 
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significant portion of the Congress’s membership depart. A secret government document 
from August of 1937 reports that an influential association of Muslim veterans, traditional 
backers of the anti-republican right Croix de Feu, had resigned their place on the executive 
committee of the Muslim Congress after Bendjelloul’s ousting.51 Rather than accept political 
exile, Bendjelloul went about creating a new coalition uniting his former anti-republican 
supporters and traditional religious factions hostile to the Ulemas. Following his expulsion, 
Bendjelloul sponsored a traditional Islamic festival in his hometown of Constantine, a move 
designed to infuriate his old allies among the reformer Ulemas and demonstrate his continued 
popularity. Attended by over 20,000 people, the Zerda reinforced Bendjelloul’s status as a 
leader among the Muslims of Constantine and strengthened the ties between his faction and 
the traditional Islamic organization.52 To lay further claim to his status as the most important 
Muslim political force, Bendjelloul called for a strike of elected Muslim officials in August 
of 1937. Despite protests from the Muslim Congress, 2,521 of 3,000 officials from the 
department of Constantine resigned their positions.53 
While the Muslim Congress was busy trying to cleanse the organization of dissenters 
like Bendjelloul, Communists in various organizations throughout Algeria were excluded 
from participation due to their leftist political positions.54 Additionally, Muslim members of 
the Communist and Socialist parties were defecting from the Popular Front. One lengthy 
report comes from the community of Sebdou, where a Muslim school teacher made a very 
public break with the left, apparently telling everyone who would listen of his disillusion 
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with the Popular Front, a party run by Jews in his opinion, and announced his intention to, 
“Shift his rifle to the other shoulder”. He went on to apply for admission to an organization 
called the Cercle Foch and attempted to publish several anti-Semitic articles in the local 
paper. The school teacher caused enough of a stir that his superiors sent a request that he be 
transferred to another post. The report justifies the request stating that even before the recent 
events he was a cause for concern as the leading Communist militant in the region.55 This 
public leap from one extreme to another was not an isolated event. As dissatisfaction with the 
Popular Front spread, organizations throughout Algeria experienced a noticeable changeover 
of personnel as administrators switched allegiances and PCA members were excluded.  
More significantly, the understanding between the Communists and the Ulemas, the 
core of the Muslim Congress, began to break up, and influential leaders of the Ulemas 
revised their stance on accommodation with France. While Larmine Lamoudi continued to 
support the Viollette project and the Popular Front government, his closest collaborators 
among the Ulemas drifted into the orbit of Messali and another influential advocate of 
Islamic independence, Chiekb Arslan. Arslan knew BenBadis from connections in the 
Wahabist and pan-Islamic movements, and Messali, after his release from prison in the 
1930s, lived in exile with Arslan in Geneva.56 Messali and BenBadis’ mutual connection to 
Arlsan may have served as a point of reconciliation between a significant portion of the 
Ulemas and Messali’s PPA, renamed after the Popular Front government dissolved the ENA. 
At the end of 1937, police surveillance reported several meetings of the political directors of 
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the PPA with BenBadis and his lieutenants at which a general truce was established.57 
Whereas one year before, Mohamed Kheirredine, an influential member of the Ulemas, 
called Messali the most dangerous man in the colony, one eager to sell Algeria to the 
enemies of France, certain members of the association of  Ulemas were now looking to 
smooth over the tensions with Messali. Surveillance reports tell us that Mohammed 
Benhoura met with Messali in August of 1937 to extend the olive branch.58 One week later a 
flattering article appeared in La Justice to explain the misunderstandings plaguing Messali’s 
PPA.59 In 1937 the CIE reported that the PPA was making new efforts to draw together the 
members of other parties that it once openly disdained.60 By this point, the Muslim Congress 
was in full collapse and the PPA was on the rise.  
Frustration with the Popular Front and doubts over assimilation had split the once 
solid Muslim Congress coalition and what the CIE end of year report sums up is the 
breakdown of the Congress: 
“The enthusiasm for the Popular Front seems to be fading like a balloon deflating. As 
those promises, so easily and widely disseminated, have gone unrealized, each 
[member of the Congress] disengages in a moment of calculated passion….At the 
same time each tries to assure a new position. Whether by organizing a new base, or 
by concluding new alliances outside the union [Congress], one can clearly feel the 
work of hands probing in the shadows.”61 
 
Faith in the republican model was definitively on the decline and two groups, Messali’s PPA 
and the European anti-republican right, profited from this collapse by attracting new 
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supporters into powerful political blocs. Each group represented an alternative anti-
republican vision and historians have contrasted these visions based on their stance on 
French presence in Algeria. However, evidence demonstrates considerable overlap in their 
anti-republican positions and significant instances of active cooperation.   
 33 
The Evolution of the Right in the Oranais  
Following the collapse of the Muslim Congress, the anti-republican right in Algeria 
was encouraged. Emboldened by the failure of the Popular Front government to push through 
the Viollette project, the anti-republican parties began a new campaign to bring Muslims into 
their ranks. At least one small group of Europeans even began stockpiling weapons in 
western Algeria and making plans for an overthrow of the state.62 While the prospects for 
armed insurgency in Algeria were in reality negligible, certain leaders of the anti-republican 
right made no secret of their desire to transform Algeria into a base from which they would 
re-conquer the Metropole.63 This scenario, while never actually attempted in the interwar 
period, had a precedent in the late 1890s when radical Europeans attempted to separate from 
France, and would be attempted twice again over the course of the Algerian War. Though an 
open revolt in the 1930s by the anti-republican right in Algeria never occurred, the popularity 
of anti-republican parties among Muslims was growing, and high-level negotiations between 
Muslim leaders and anti-republican European politicians were underway. If not for the 
intervention of the Second World War, the anti-republican right may have put together a 
movement capable of challenging the assimilatory rhetoric underpinning the French 
Republic’s colonial philosophy. 
Both European and Muslim anti-republican protest were taking a more active form. In 
March of 1937 the prefect of Oran reported that several strikes by Muslim agricultural 
workers necessitated the deployment of the mobile reserves of the gendarmes supported by a 
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63Ageron attributes this vision to Victor Arrighi, Doriot’s delegate for Algeria. Ageron, Histoire de L’Algérie 
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regiment of the Foreign Legion to keep the peace. The report emphasized that social 
movements only rarely seen in the country were spreading through the efforts of propaganda 
originating in the newspapers of Oran. The prefect closed his report by pleading with the 
Governor General to allocate more relief funds to help quell discontent, as he feared that 
without it, unrest would spread.64  
It would be a mistake to view cooperation between the anti-republican right and 
Muslim politicians as one continuous association interrupted by the Muslim Congress years. 
In addition to new actors in the anti-republican right, the rhetoric emerging on both European 
and Muslim sides developed a new tone. Rather than be content to merely criticize the failed 
institutions of the Republic, the anti-republican right and their Muslim listeners developed a 
new enthusiasm for solutions. The optimism inspired and disappointed by the Muslim 
Congress persisted, and dynamic politicians on the anti-republican right were poised to take 
advantage of it by offering a host of alternative projects.  
Contributing to the number of viable alternatives was the wealth of fascist 
propaganda arriving in Algeria from Italy, Germany and Spain. El Ouma of Paris, the press 
of the ENA/PPA published an article on 1 June 1937 approving of Fascist Italy’s liberal 
colonial politics. The article condemns France and England’s colonial excesses and makes no 
mention of Italy’s colonial invasion of Ethiopia.65 In July of 1937, a secret police report from 
Oran notes that a member of the PPA was working in the Italian consulate and comments 
with some concern that he buys copious rounds of drinks for his fellow members of the PPA 
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with the consulate’s money, perhaps courting Muslims for the Italians.66 Yet another report 
in the same month, this one from a local military commander, expresses concern that certain 
rumors originating with members of the PPA claim that Italy favors Muslims more than 
France does. The commander goes on to wonder which side Algerian Muslims would support 
if the propaganda continues.67  
The origin of this propaganda is difficult to locate. As early as 1936, reports indicate 
that German propaganda in Algeria was significant, and that Chekib Arslan and his 
connections among the Ulemas were the primary outlets for such anti-French sentiment. One 
report specifically claims that the Germans supported Arslan in Geneva.68 However, it also 
claims that the Arab-Berber mindset is infused with the same notions of ethnic purity that 
inspire German racism. The author also notes that works by Nietzsche were very popular that 
year among students at the Medrasa.69 Tellingly, a later report from the same office lists two 
sources of foreign interference in Algerian affairs, Moscow and Arslan’s Geneva circle. In its 
final appraisal, the report indicated that Moscow’s influence would weaken with the decline 
of the Popular Front, while Geneva’s would thrive, “as its actions, interpreted by the Ulemas 
and l’Etoile, are more comprehensible and more compatible with [the mass’s] deeper 
aspirations.70 
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While observers in the military may have been more concerned with German or 
Italian propaganda, another source of fascist influence was the municipal government of 
Oran. Much closer in terms of distance to Spain than to France, many Algerian Europeans in 
the department of Oran maintained close ties with Franco’s government. Chief among them 
was the mayor of Oran, Gabriel Lambert.  
Lambert was a former priest and a maverick politician who occupied a central 
position in anti-republican politics in western Algeria. His political success seemed to derive 
from his control over the municipal administrators in the city of Oran and minor elected 
officials from the surrounding region. Lambert maintained close ties with the Franco 
administration and was suspected of passing information to the Spanish. A secret report 
relying on a source in the Spanish postal office confirmed that Lambert had addressed several 
letters to Franco’s foreign ministry.71 Another report details a visit Lambert made to Spanish 
Morocco and Spain, “entirely at the expense of the Spanish government.”72 
Lambert’s hold over power in Oran was accomplished through a network of personal 
ties to business leaders and important relationships with Muslim administrators whose votes 
ensured his control over municipal politics. When undertaking an official visit to Spain, 
Lambert intended to be accompanied by his Muslim adjunct Mohammed Mekki, who at the 
last moment pulled out of the trip. In October of 1937, Abbé Lambert, changed the name of 
his political party from Amities Lambert to Amities Latines et Musulmanes. Shortly after, he 
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approached PPA representatives to inquire about joint funding for a propaganda campaign.73 
In October of 1938, police reports indicate that Lambert shielded a Muslim Élu elected to 
office through the Popular Front from police investigation.74 While Lambert certainly held 
sway in Oran, his manifestations of animosity towards the Republic were limited to sharing 
close relations with unfriendly foreign powers. His position of authority derived from skillful 
manipulation of electoral politics and through cultivating naturalized Muslim citizens to use 
against his rivals. If Lambert disapproved of the Viollette project it would be on the grounds 
that more Muslim electors would dilute his source of power among naturalized Muslims.  
While Lambert relied on personal relationships of patronage and sought to capitalize 
on traditional paternalist forms of leadership, another group was gaining ground in Oran with 
a much more openly anti-republican platform. Jacques Doriot’s Parti Populaire Française 
developed strategy to attract Muslims which formulated a counter proposal for Muslim 
integration with France.75 
Doriot had been a prominent anti-colonial advocate among the Communists before 
defecting to the anti-republican right in the spring of 1934. His anti-colonial past in Morocco, 
along with the decline of the Croix de Feu, would have left Doriot’s PPF as the anti-
republican group most familiar to Muslims. A concentrated propaganda campaign including 
bi-lingual PPF pamphlets and numerous organized speeches in Arabic by Muslim members 
spread the PPF agenda in Western Algeria. In addition to the press campaign, Doriot 
undertook two highly publicized tours through Algeria where he lectured on the “Muslim 
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problem” to mixed audiences of Muslims and Europeans. The PPF campaign in Algeria 
attempted to attract Muslims and Europeans into one political organization united against the 
Republic’s administration of Algeria.  
Two Muslim Élus, Bentabet and Bentami were Doriot’s most valuable assets in his 
campaign to create a broad coalition of Europeans and Muslims. They had considerable 
responsibility and were present at the highest level meetings in Algeria. Reports indicate that 
they traveled with a PPF regional delegate, Victor Arrighi, to Paris at one point to consult 
with Doriot over his strategy for Algeria. The fact that the anti-republican parties involved 
Muslims in strategy decisions was not lost on government observers. In one CIE report, the 
author comments that part of the frustration demonstrated by Muslims with regards to the 
Communist party was the Communists’ unwillingness to place Muslims in positions of 
responsibility.76 The anti-republican right, though often mentioned in connection with racist 
xenophobia, rewarded Muslim members with high level positions. 
As early as 1936, the PPF in Algeria under the direction of Victor Arrighi were 
holding meetings to discuss Muslim concerns in Algeria.77 At one such meeting in 
Mostaganem, the Muslim Élu, Dr. Bentami, introduced a speaker who examined the future of 
Muslim-European relations for a mixed crowd of Muslims and Europeans, including local 
business leaders, local administrators and former members of the other anti-republican 
parties.78 The speaker, a former communist, argued that France had failed in its mission to 
civilize Algerians and had produced wheat and wine in Algeria but not men. He argued that 
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methods must change, that the colons must soften their stance against Muslims and afford 
them a living wage, a better life, and the justice which Muslims rightly demand.  
To respond to the Viollette project, Doriot developed his own program of reforms for 
Algerian Muslims. The Doriot Plan rejected the premise of assimilation and stated that, 
“Muslims have the right to preserve their religion and their [separate] legal status.”79  At a 
meeting on May 26 1937, Gaston Vidal, the secretary the Oran section of the PPF, declared, 
“We must undertake a crusade to make France understand that in Algeria there are two 
million of our Muslim brothers who have had their heads filled with illusory projects while 
they are dying of hunger.”80 The PPF’s disdain for assimilation and their continued attacks 
on the government’s conduct in Algeria drew attention from Algerian Muslims.  
The most curious manifestation of new alliance building took place between Doriot’s 
PPF and Messali’s PPA. Messali had always maintained a firm demand for Algerian 
independence, yet when Messali was arrested on 27 August 1937, the PPF’s Vidal published 
an article in Oran-Matin which announced his group as “concerned”. It noted that if 
notorious Communists such as BenBadis and Barthel were allowed their liberty, Messali was 
certainly entitled to his. Gaston Vidal, the chairman of the Oran section of the PPF assured 
his readers that such a penalty [prison] would be justified if Messali was advocating 
independence as he had during the days of the Etoile. Vidal pointed out that, “today 
[Messali] demands only dominion.”81  In his biography of Messali, Benjamin Stora reports 
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that critics of Messali increasingly associated his PPA with Doriot's PPF.82 While this 
interpretation of Messali’s vision as non-threatening to French interest in Algeria is not proof 
of those allegations that PPA equates to PPF, it is nonetheless surprising that the PPF could 
see past Messali’s prior position on French rule in Algeria.  
After Messali’s arrest, his organization took steps towards partnership with the PPF 
and with Lambert’s Oran circle. Messali’s PPA, underground since its dissolution by the 
Popular Front government, lacked any centralized leadership, and local leaders independently 
reached out to various political organizations. A new umbrella organization, the Djemia el 
Felah, had sprung up sometime following the dissolution of the PPA. This group is not 
analyzed by any of the CIE reports, nor does it appear in any of the regular reports on the 
press.83 It does however figure noticeably in the regular police reports of Muslim political 
activity. In the short time from Messali’s arrest to the outbreak of hostilities and his ultimate 
deportation to West Africa, Djemia el Felah accrued a wide range of associations with 
seemingly antagonistic organizations.84  
The only way to identify Djemia el Falah with the PPA is through a cross-listing  of 
members and leaders occasionally compiled by the prefecture in Oran.85 Certain anti-colonial 
statements and an almost complete absence of communists and socialists in attendance at the 
meetings suggests a continuity between Djemia el Falah and the PPA. In March of 1939 forty 
members of Djemia el Falah met with the leading Muslim members of the PPF, Zine 
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Bentabet and Dr.Bentami.86 The purpose of the meeting was to find a suitable response to 
unspecified government complaints directed at Djemia .87 Another such document, marked 
secret, reports on a private Djemia el Falah meeting attended by noted PPA members along 
with Muslims working for the town hall of Oran and the paper Oran-Matin, at this time 
under the direction of Doriot’s PPF.88 Also identified at the meeting was a prominent 
member of the association of Ulemas. The agenda discussed was the establishment of a pan-
north African front to defend Muslim interests. This meeting, involving Ulemas, Djemia el 
Falah, former PPA members, and known associates of the anti-parliamentary right, reveals a 
different process of coalition building following the collapse of the Muslim Congress.  
Conclusion 
 Ageron and Julien’s histories of Algeria continue their narratives of Algerian politics 
following the dissolution of the Muslim Congress with a focus on the new political parties 
established by Ferhat Abbas and Mohammed Bendjelloul in the Constantine region. These 
rival organizations have been interpreted by historians as an indicator of radicalization 
among the Muslim political elite. As the Muslim Congress collapsed Abbas led a portion of 
its members to demand more independence for Algerian Muslims and increased political 
rights. Historians of Algerian nationalism interpret this move as a significant moment when a 
                                                 
869H28, Report of Chef de la sûreté départementale, 17 March 1939. Bentami, it should be noted, is a long time 
associate of Mohammed Benhoura of La Justice. 
 
87Interestingly the members of Djemia el Falah accused the same Élu protected by Lambert, a man named 
Bachterzi, of putting the government on to them, indicating perhaps competition between Lambert’s 
organization and Doriot’s PPF.  
 
88Reports claim that both the town hall and the paper Oran-Matin were completely controlled by the PPF or 
other similar rightist organizations. Other reports indicate that Oran-Matin offered frequent apéritifs for local 
Muslim notables that were well attended 9H46, Chef de la sûreté departementale to the Préfet, 15 March  1936. 
 
 42 
nationalist movement began to articulate demands for Algerian autonomy from France.89 
These demands emphasized the cultural specificity of Algeria and called for three changes: 
instruction of Arabic, liberty to practice their Islam, and an education system separate from 
that France. These desires run contrary to the ideology of assimilation underpinning the 
Republic’s colonial philosophy. And while these scholars are correct in pointing to them as 
an important evolution in the development of Algerian nationalism, what they do not account 
for is that at the same time, coalitions proposing the same measures of Algerian autonomy 
were encouraged and supported by European political parties.  
 With the formation of the Muslim Congress, a process was set in motion that could 
not be undone. The Popular Front made promises to Muslims which it ultimately could not 
keep, and in doing so, it created a stronger desire for reform throughout Algeria. The Muslim 
Congress momentarily forestalled criticism of the republican government, but after its 
collapse, Muslim advocates for reform in Algeria returned to opposition parties with new 
expectations. In western Algeria, the European parties with an established record of 
challenging the government administration were those of the anti-republican right, and these 
organizations capitalized on growing Muslim discontent to swell their ranks. The nascent 
Algerian nationalists and the anti-republican right shared an enemy in the government of the 
Republic, but the axiom, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, is not sufficient to explain the 
relationship between the two.  
What permitted these two seemingly divided interests to act together was a shared 
rejection of the model of assimilation and the republican government that endorsed it. In the 
short term at least, nationalist interests and anti-republican interests coincided, and the 
potential advantages of partnership led each side to make some concessions. The benefits of 
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such a partnership become less clear once the common enemy was removed. Once the anti-
republican right assumed power in Algeria under Vichy, they no longer needed to cooperate 
with the Muslim leadership to secure their position. Talk of accommodation came to a halt as 
the anti-republican parties, once in opposition, were now left to manage the restless European 
colons who were reluctant to see any autonomy extended to their Muslim subordinates. 
Unwilling to alienate their European backers, the anti-republicans made no more 
compromises with the Muslim leadership, leaving Messali’s nationalist party as the only 
alternative to the French Republic.   
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